

A Commitment of an Exchange Outcome to an Organization.

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# A COMMITMENT OF AN EXCHANGE OUTCOME TO AN ORGANIZATION.

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**ABSTRACT.** The explicit SPECIFICATION of time limits by an organization to give probable correct inference binds oneself IN advance to these actions. This is an overlook about commitment of agents in an exchange outcome of an organization. In addressing this issue, this work is done.

Keywords. policy exchange productivity, price, exchange, outcome, commitment

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# **1 INTRODUCTION**

An exchange is a situation in which one agent[4] (party, business, organization) in e-commerce[1] setup give a customer/consumer product differentiation. A customer[2] is an organization that places orders, negotiate with terms, take delivery and consume a polex information. Policy exchange information is of importance in situation where the buyers and sellers are separated from the market structure. Customers normally visit the web sites of multiple vendors (parties) round the clock a day to compare prices and make purchase, without having to leave their homes or offices from around the globe. The composite theory models this problem by assuming that the customer has no all day to compare large quantity of goods and demand satisfaction, and supply of exchange information. Economic growth will result from better ways of exchanging and processing information. Internet technologies will permit organization (sellers) to track the interest and preferences of their customer's with the customer's permission and then use this information to build an ongoing relationship with the customer by customizing products and services to meet the customer's needs. The ongoing relationships with the customer demands three relationship models namely:[5]

- Customer Relationship Management (CRM).
- Customer Relationship Governance (CRG)
- Customer Relationship Guidance(CRGui).

The ongoing relationship information tracking problem is modeled by the *information composite theory*,

### it states that the information about ongoing relationships with customers demand three customer relationship (3-CR) models – CRM ,CRG and CRGui.

CRM, CRG and CRGui can be and pronounced CR-Guimag. policy looking simply at tackled with the working theory, theory-How people may react to customers. This presents explicit assumptions about people's or business conducts. The 3– are better needs meet up with of the environment in which the ,business, organization) make the customer. Customers are



shorthanded to CR-Guimg The pitfalls in evaluating correlations in the data is information composite policy changes especially the models, specifying all preferences and constraints customer relationship models customers by full specification economic agent (party their decisions as to needs of endowed when decisions are

made for them, then they have y units of time which can be used in leisure or as an exchange outcome. Customers are able to observe directly the realization of a variable market price of good demand.

### **2 COMMITMENT OUTCOME**

The exchange outcomes of an organization includes productivity, endowment, commitment and motivation. Illustrated as

**Commitment** : The explicit specification of time limits by an organization to give probable correct inference binds oneself in advance to these actions. The most effective means of convincing customers about future actions is to bind oneself in advance to these actions. For example, a customer taking a day to compare prices and making



a purchase can offer the Organization something of value as credit, to be seized by the organization if the creditor fails to pay for the goods. A contract[3] that makes this arrangement formal can be enforced by the legal system provided by the CRG. The creditor now has ab incentive not to default on the credit. By



making the payment of the credit in her best interest, the customer becomes committed to the future action. Commitment is not easy for the organization because the organization is both the provider of the payment systems and the enforcer of contracts. Illustrated is explicit specification of inference binds of an economic agent. The creditor now believes that the

customer will pay the credit not because

the customer is particularly honest by nature, but because the creditor knows the customer will want to pay in order to avoid the service of the goods. The organization

#### Article on Multi-agent Economics Design

may be able to arrange that the customer not be punished if it fails the debt. As a result, the organization may be unable to commit itself to promised future actions and this may be unable to secure payment. As an analogy, imagine the consequences of law that prohibited penalizing customers who default. Anticipatory that customers will never wish to pay their debts, whatever their promises, creditors will be unwilling to credit the owing organization. As a result, both creditors and customers will be worse off under such a law. This is so because the customer is worse off for not getting the goods purchased and the creditor being it a bank do not receive any charges on their credit card provision. The creditor is the credit card provider and the customer is the card-holder, and they know themselves. To commit itself to its promised future actions, the Organization must give customer some of its free will to act in the future. One way to do this is to establish an independent on-line payment system that can oblige customers to keep its promises. A promise model for warranting in the market-space for situated assurance is defined from the establishment. A customer fills the arguments of the payment system with its detail especially the demographics and the owing amount. The notions of authorization and settlement are separated to some degree and this each authorization matches a settlement. During the information transaction, an authentication or approval setup provides an authorization for the transaction and the settlement happens later. An on-line payment system is the foundation of systems for electronic cash and notational money (credit cards, purchase orders and electronic funds transfer) to represent a commitment, which is really a promise to pay at some time in the future. A notational money refers to something that represents value stored by a financial institution as a designator to guarantee an amount at some point in the future.

Organization's increasing commitment to an establishment of actionable exchange allows a systematic biases to convey consistency. These come out of attempts to minimize effort and shortcut the decision process. An organization desiring to be an effective leader in the game of policy exchange needs to convey consistency – A characteristic often associated with effective leaders.

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### **3 FURTHER WORK**

The previous research work did look at productivity[6] and endowment[7] of an organisation exchange outcomes. In this issue, author did make an attempt to describe an agent commitment to exchange outcomes in an organization. The next outcomes will look at Motivation only.

## **4 CONCLUSION**

In concluding remarks, there is a need to look at an agent's commitment to uneasy provision of payment systems and the enforcer of contracts. Organization's increasing commitment to an establishment of actionable exchange will allow a systematic biases to convey consistency. These come out of attempts to minimize effort and shortcut the decision process.

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